وبلاگ خانه تبدیل شباهنگ مرکز تخصصی تبدیل صدا و تصویر
One of the easiest ways to understand the concept behind the contract curve is to look at a trade agreement that exists between two entities known as Trader A and Trader B. The former has an interest in the goods offered by the latter and vice versa. As a result, the two sides will enter into negotiations to organize some kind of exchange that will be mutually beneficial to both sides, trying to agree on issues such as the number of units each party will buy and the unit prices that apply to both sets of goods. Assuming that both parties can enter into an employment agreement or contract that allows either party to make volume purchases at certain price levels for the period of a calendar year, the relationship serves both parties well. Everyone benefits from the agreement, in terms of selling goods and also buying goods that are considered desirable. Once this contract is concluded, there is a good chance that Dealer B will no longer consider the agreement advantageous and will seek a new agreement with another dealer if Dealer A wishes to reduce the volume purchased by Dealer B while maintaining the unit price associated with the previous volume commitment. At this point, the contractual curve of history between the two dealers is reached and the continuation of the employment relationship becomes sterile. De: Contract curve in an economic dictionary » In microeconomics, the contract curve is the set of points that represent the final allocations of two goods between two people that could occur as a result of a mutually beneficial trade between these people given their initial allocations of goods. All points in this locus are effective Pareto assignments, which means that there is no redistribution of any of these points that could make one of the people more satisfied with their allowance without satisfying the other person less. The contract curve is the subset of Pareto efficiency points that could be achieved by trading from the initial inventories of both assets. It is drawn in the diagram of the Edgeworth box illustrated here, in which the assignment of each person is measured vertically for one good and horizontally for the other good from the origin of that person (zero-point assignment of the two goods); The origin of one person is the lower left corner of the Edgeworth field, and the origin of the other person is the upper right corner of the field. The initial allocation of persons (initial allowances of the two assets) is represented by a point in the diagram; The two people will exchange goods with each other until no other mutually beneficial transactions are possible.
The set of points at which they can stop conceptually are the points of the contractual curve. However, some authors[1] identify the contractual curve as the entire Pareto-efficient locus from one origin to another. Note that the above optimizations are not the ones that both people would actually engage in, explicitly or implicitly. Instead, these optimizations are simply a way for the economist to identify points on the contract curve. The place of efficient Pareto allocations in a barter economy. In an Edgeworth field, the contract curve is the set of tangential points between the indifference curves of the two consumers. It is called the contract curve because the outcome of negotiations on trade between two consumers should lead to an agreement (a “contract”) that has a result on the contractual curve. The competitive equilibrium of an economy is always on the contract curve. If two entities have a contract and only one entity no longer exists, is the contract null and void? Scenario: “One” leased property, then sublet to “Two”. “Two” no longer exists, so is the contract valid in any way? Would the answer be the same if it were “One” who no longer exists? Thank you very much! Thus, the contract curve, the set of points where Octavio and Abby could land, is the section of the effective Pareto locus located inside the lens formed by the initial maps.
The analysis can not tell at what particular moment of the contract curve they will land – it depends on the negotiation skills of both people. For two goods and two people, the contractual curve is as follows. Here x 2 1 {displaystyle x_{2}^{1}} refers to the final amount of voucher 2, person 1, etc. u 1 {displaystyle u^{1}} and you 2 {displaystyle u^{2}} refer to the final levels of advantage felt by person 1 or person 2, u 0 2 {displaystyle u_{0}^{2}} refers to the benefit that person 2 would receive from the initial allocation without acting at all, and ω ۱ t o t {displaystyle omega _{1}^{tot}} and ω ۲ t o t {displaystyle omega _{2}^{tot}} refer to the Total fixed quantities of goods 1 and 2. Search: “Contractual curve” in Oxford Reference » Both people will continue to act as long as the marginal substitution rate of each individual (the absolute value of the slope of the person`s indifference curve at that time) differs from that of the other person in the current allocation (in this case, there is a mutually acceptable business relationship of one good for the other, between the different marginal substitution rates). At a point where Octavio`s marginal substitution rate is equal to Abby`s marginal substitution rate, mutually beneficial exchange is no longer possible. This point is called Pareto-efficient balance. In Edgeworth`s box, this is a point where Octavio`s indifference curve is tangential to Abby`s indifference curve, and it is inside the lens formed by its initial mappings.
A contract curve is one of the different economic curves used to illustrate when the possibility for buyers and sellers to consider an advantageous transaction is exceeded and the motivation to continue the transaction no longer exists. Projecting this curve, which is considered part of the pareto-efficient allocations, can help determine when there is still a valid reason to continue the transaction and when both parties should simply move on to other opportunities. where u 1 {displaystyle u^{1}} is the advantage that person 1 would experience if it were not exchanged far from the original foundation. By varying the weighting parameter b, we can follow the entire contract curve: if b = 1, the problem is the same as the previous problem, and it identifies an effective point on an edge of the lens formed by the indifference curves of the initial equipment; If b = 0, the total weight is on the benefit of person 2 instead of person 1, and therefore the optimization identifies the effective point on the other side of the goal. Since b varies uniformly between these two extremes, all intermediate points of the contractual curve are plotted. To understand the entire contract curve, the above optimization problem can be modified as follows. .
