وبلاگ خانه تبدیل شباهنگ مرکز تخصصی تبدیل صدا و تصویر
۱۲۸ z.B. Croatia FIPPA, loc. cit. note 80; Agreement on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments between the Government of the People`s Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (entered into force on 1 August 2004) (26 November 2001), online: UNCTAD . 77 China`s FIPPA does not extend the obligation to grant market access on the basis of most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment to trade agreements or FIRPA before 1994. China FIPPA, agg. Note 2 to Article 8(1)(a)(i),(b). For China, the “national security review” may include a review of various forms of investment for national security purposes. At the time of entry into force of this agreement, the specific legal document for the verification of China`s national security is the circular of the General Office of the State Council on the establishment of the security screening system for mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises by foreign investors, which focuses on the verification of mergers and acquisitions of domestic companies by foreign investors. In contrast, Canada`s four FIPPs prior to 1994 do not extend to the pre-establishment phase.
See Appendix 2 to this article. 97 See Fippa of Canada with Costa Rica (Annex I, Section VI, points 1 to 2); Croatia (Annex I, Section VI, points 1 to 2); Ecuador (Article II(4)(a) to (b)); Egypt (Article II(4)(a) to (b)); Latvia (Article II(4)(a) to (b)); Panama (art. II para. 4 lit. a–b); Philippines (art. II 4-5); Romania (Article II(4)(a) to (b)); Trinidad and Tobago (Article II(4)(a) to (b)); Ukraine (Article II(4)(a) to (b)); Uruguay (Annex I, Section VI, points 1 to 2); and Venezuela (Annex II, items 3 (a) to (b)).) See Annex 2 to this Article; relevant contractual texts available online: DFATD . Consider also Article 40, the tit-for-tat text, which introduces the retaliatory measures generally applied by China in the context of investment trade. In relation to trade, however, it is less clear what constitutes an appropriate “appropriate” investment measure for countries that have taken “prohibitive” or “restrictive” measures against Beijing and is at Beijing`s discretion. Article 40 illustrates in its own way Beijing`s approach to trade and investment as a potential lever in relations with foreign governments.
۲ Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People`s Republic of China on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments (September 9, 2012), online: [not yet in force] [China FIPPA]. For Canada`s reported delay in ratification, see McCarthy, Shawn , “Pressure Mounts with Tories Ready to Ratifiify China Trade Deal by Thursday,” Globe and Mail (October 30, 2012), online: ; Google Scholar Mas, Susana, “Delayed China trade deal reflect Tory dissent, NDP says,” CBC News (April 22, 2013), online: CBC News . Google Scholar 11 This distinguishes the Chinese FIPPA from Canada`s FIPPA model, see above. Note 8; NAFTA, see note 3 above; Canada`s other trade agreements that provide for ISAs; and all but two of the twenty-five FIRPA. These two FIPPs also do not raise comparable regulatory flexibility issues for Canada, as they apply to low levels of foreign direct investment. See Appendix 2 to this article. Elizabeth May said FIPA is a threat to Canadian sovereignty. May called the negotiations “mysterious.” The terms of the agreement were not made public until after the fall of the Harper administration. Critics said some of the conditions were seen as unfavourable to Canadian investors and citizens. [16] 31 No other relevant treaty to which Canada has acceded contains the explicit clarification contained in the Chinese LIP THAT access to AIS may be denied after an application from an International Searching Authority has been initiated. China FIPPA, loc. cit.
Note 2, art. 18 para. 3. See NAFTA, loc. cit., 3, Article 1113(2); FiPPA Model of Canada, see footnote 8, Article 18(2), Thorn and Doucleff, note 24 above, pp. 25-26. Other contracts entered into by Canada that contain more ambiguous provisions on denial of benefits include Canada`s PLANSGPF with Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Jordan, Latvia, Peru, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Tanzania, as well as Canada`s trade agreements with Chile, Colombia, Panama and Peru. In addition, seventeen of Canada`s FIPPs, the most recent of which (with Croatia) came into force in 2001, do not contain provisions on denial of benefits. See Appendix 1 to this article. 52 China FIPPA, op. cit.
Cit. Note 2, Article 33, paragraph 2. The agreement also includes a general exception for cultural industries similar to that of other PSAC and Canadian trade agreements (Section 33(1)). 73 Cross-examination MacKay, loc. cit. Note 1-39: “[I]n 90% of investments entering the Chinese market are subject to review in accordance with laws, regulations and rules.” Chamber of Commerce of the European Union in China (EUCCC), European Business in China Position Paper 2013/2014 (EUCCC, 2013) at 19-20: “China has used the enormous size of its domestic market to protect domestic enterprises and set market access conditions for foreign companies. While the corresponding rankings do not necessarily define good economic policy, China was listed online as the most restrictive of the fifty-five countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development`s (OECD) FDI Regulatory Compliance Index in September 2013 .
